

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 KINSHA 04345 01 OF 02 021615Z  
ACTION TRSE-00

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-12 ISO-00 EB-08 COME-00 OMB-01  
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FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9482  
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE  
AMEMBASSY BANGUI  
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KINSHASA 4345

DEPT PASS TREASURY

LIBREVILLE PASS A/S BERGSTEN AND DAS WALKER

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OVIP, CG  
SUBJECT: A/S BERGSTEN MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MOBUTU

1. SUMMARY: TREASURY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BERGSTEN, ACCOMPANIED BY DAS WALKER AND AMBASSADOR, MET WITH PRESIDENT MOBUTU AT HIS RESIDENCE FOR ALMOST TWO HOURS APRIL 28. BERGSTEN REITERATED US COMMITMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO PARTICIPATE IN MOBUTU PLAN, BUT STRESSED NECESSITY OF GOZ'S REACHING AGREEMENT WITH IMF ON NEW STABILIZATION PROGRAM BEFORE US CAN DETERMINE LEVEL AND NATURE OF ITS ASSISTANCE. BERGSTEN EXPLAINED US POLICY OF WORKING INCREASINGLY THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LENDING INSTITUTIONS AND EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THESE INSTITUTIONS AND PRIVATE BANKS WOULD HAVE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR ZAIRE ONCE IMPLEMENTATION OF BOTH IMF AGREEMENT AND MOBUTU PLAN UNDERWAY. MOBUTU EXPRESSED  
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 KINSHA 04345 01 OF 02 021615Z

SATISFACTION AND GAVE ASSURANCES IMF AGREEMENT AND DETAILS OF MOBUTU PLAN WOULD BE IN HAND PRIOR TO BRUSSELS MEETING OF DONORS PLANNED FOR EARLY JUNE. HOWEVER, HE UNDERScoreD ZAIRE'S NEED FOR GREATER US PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT IN CONTEXT OF ENCOURAGING OTHER DONORS AS WELL AS ASSURING AFRICAN MODERATES CONCERNED WITH SOVIET/CUBAN ENCROACHMENTS. BERGSTEN MADE CLEAR THAT US CONTINUED TO SHARE THAT CONCERN AND NOTED THAT ONLY MANNER OF

EXPRESSING OUR CONCERN WAS CHANGING. IN RESPONSE TO MOBUTU'S WORRY THAT US HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS WERE SERVING TO DEBRIVE NEEDY PEOPLE RATHER THAN JUST THEIR LEADERS OF US ASSISTANCE (E.G. IN CAE AND UGANDA), BERGSTEN STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS ELEMENT IN US FOREIGN POLICY AND EXPLAINED HOW CURRENT US LAW MAKES A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN UN UNATTRACTIVE REGIME AND ITS PEOPLE. HE RECOGNIZED DIFFICULTIES FACING GOZ BUT EXPRESSED HOPE FOR STEADY IMPROVEMENT OF ZAIRE'S HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE. DESPITE FRANKNESS OF SOME OF EXCHANGES, MOBUTU WAS RESPONSIVE AND EXCEPTIONALLY GOOD HUMOR, AND HE SEEMED TO ENJOY ONE OF LONGEST MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN VISITOR WE CAN REMEMBER. END SUMMARY.

2. ASSISTANT SECRETARY BERGSTEN BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE WAS VERY ENCOURAGED BY WHAT HE HAD LEARNED OF ZAIRE'S EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE ECONOMIC RECOVERY. HE FOUND THE MOBUTU PLAN, WITH ITS

EMPHASIS ON FINANCIAL AND MONETARY STABILIZATION AND ON THE REHABILITATION OF THE AGRICULTURAL, TRANSPORT AND MANUFACTURING SECTORS, TO REFLECT A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF WHAT WAS NEEDED TO RECREATE THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY TO TAP ZAIRE'S ENORMOUS POTENTIAL FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. HE RECALLED THAT THE US COMMITMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MOBUTU PLAN WAS EXPRESSED RECENTLY BY PRESIDENT CARTER IN HIS LETTER TO MOBUTU OF MARCH 16.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 KINSHA 04345 01 OF 02 021615Z

3. BERGSTEN PRAISED MOBUTU FOR HIS POLITICALLY COURAGEOUS DECISION TO CALL IN FOREIGN EXPERTS TO PROVIDE NEEDED MANAGEMENT SKILLS. HE STRESSED THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF AN IMF STABILIZATION AGREEMENT, AND EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH PLANNING COMMISSIONER MULUMBA'S STATEMENT THAT MORNING (SEPTTEL) THAT BOTH THE NEW IMF AGREEMENT AND THE FINAL VERSION OF THE MOBUTU PLAN WOULD BE READY BY EARLY JUNE, WHEN THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT HAS CALLED A MEETING OF DONOR COUNTRIES IN BRUSSELS. BERGSTEN ADDED THAT, ONCE AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF HAS BEEN REACHED AND DETAILS OF THE MOBUTU PLAN BECOME AVAILABLE, THE US WILL BE ABLE TO DETERMINE THE LEVEL AND KIND OF ASSISTANCE IT WILL PROVIDE.

4. MOBUTU EXPRESSED GREAT SATISFACTION WITH BERGSTEN'S OBSERVATIONS AND REITERATED MULUMBA'S ASSURANCES THAT THE IMF AGREEMENT AND THE DETAILS OF THE MOBUTU PLAN WOULD BE IN HAND PRIOR TO THE BRUSSELS MEETING. HE MENTIONED THAT HIS AMBASSADOR TO BRUSSELS HAD JUST TELEPHONED HIM TO REPORT THAT THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED TO HOLD THE MEETING JUNE 10-12. MOBUTU THEN SAID WITH GOOD HUMOR THAT HE WAS ESPECIALLY HEARTENED BY BERGSTEN'S VISIT BECAUSE EVERYONE KNOWS THAT THE US CAN DETERMINE THE POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING INSTITUTIONS LIKE THE IBRD AND THE IMF BECAUSE IT HAS "35 PERCENT OF THE VOTES".

IF THE US WANTS THESE INSTITUTIONS TO HELP ZAIRE, THEY WILL. AS FOR GOZ, MOBUTU ADDED, "ZAIRE HAS NEVER HAD ANY TROUBLE WITH THE IMF SINCE 1967."

5. BERGSTEN REPLIED THAT THE US IS TRYING TO WORK INCREASINGLY THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LENDING INSTITUTIONS TO ACHIEVE THE MULTIBPLIER EFFECT OF COMBINING ITS FUNDS WITH THOSE OF OTHER DONORS. HE REFERRED TO THE FIFTH IDA REPLENISHMENT LAST YEAR AND THE INCREASED LENDING TO ZAIRE THAT HAS RESULTED AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF HOW THIS POLICY CAN BENEFIT THE GOZ.

6. MOBUTU SAID HE AGREED WITH OUR OBJECTIVES, BUT WAS CONCERNED THAT THE VERY IMPORTANT DIMENSION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT COULD NOT BE PROVIDED THROUGH SUCH INSTITUTIONS. IF OTHERS SAW THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 KINSHA 04345 01 OF 02 021615Z

US STOOD BEHIND ZAIRE AND ITS ECONOMIC RECOVERY EFFORTS, HE SAID, THOSE EFFORTS WOULD SUCCEED. IF NOT, THERE WOULD BE LITTLE PROSPECT OF AVOIDING FAILURE.

7. BERGSTEN REPLIED THAT HIS VISIT TO ZAIRE WAS AN INDICATION OF THAT SUPPORT. HE ASSURED MOBUTU THAT IBRD, EXIMBANK AND THE PRIVATE BANKS ALL HAD LARGE AND GROWING SUMS AVAILABLE FOR LENDING. ONCE THE IMF AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SIGNED, THE DETAILS OF THE MOBUTU PLAN WERE AVAILABLE, AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BOTH WERE CLEARLY UNDERWAY, HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE NECESSARY FINANCING WOULD EMERGE.

8. MOBUTU TURNED TO THE RECENT DECLINES IN ZAIRE'S EXPORTS, ARGUING THAT CRITICISM OF ZAIRE'S EXPORT PERFORMANCE AS EVIDENCE OF MISMANAGEMENT WAS UNJUST BECAUSE IT OVERLOOKED TRANSPORTATION CONSTRAINTS. WITH THE LOSS OF SHABA'S ACCESS TO THE PORTS OF LOBITO AND BEIRA, AND THE UNRELIABILITY OF TRANSPORTATION ROUTES LINKING EASTERN ZAIRE WITH DAR-ES-SALAAM AND MOMBASA, ONLY THE RIVER/RAIL ROUTE TO ZAIRE'S PORT OF MATADI REMAINED AVAILABLE. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS ROUTE IS CAPABLE ONLY OF HANDLING 30 PERCENT OF ZAIRE'S EXPORTS.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 KINSHA 04345 02 OF 02 021619Z  
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P 021455Z MAY 78  
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9483  
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
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AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 KINSHASA 4345

DEPT PASS TREASURY

LIBREVILLE PASS A/S BERGSTEN AND DAS WALKER

9. MOBUTU THEN RETURNED TO HIS EARLIER THEME OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF US SUPPORT FOR ZAIRE. HE RECALLED WITH ENTHUSIASM THAT DURING AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO WASHINGTON SEVERAL YEARS AGO THE PRESIDENT OF THE EXIMBANK HAD CALLED ON HIM AT BLAIR HOUSE TO INFORM HIM THAT THE BANK HAD AGREED THAT NO LOAN CEILING WOULD BE IMPOSED ON ZAIRE, ALTHOUGH THE NORMAL CRITERIA WOULD BE APPLIED IN EVALUATING THE VIABILITY OF EACH PROJECT. MOBUTU CONCLUDED THAT THAT KIND OF GESTURE OF SUPPORT, INDICATING THAT THE US STANDS BEHIND ZAIRE, IS WORTH A BILLION DOLLARS IN AID.

10. BERGSTEN REPLIED THAT WASHINGTON WAS WELL AWARE OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE ZAIRIAN ECONOMY HAD BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY EXTERNAL FACTORS OVER WHICH IT HAD NO CONTROL. IN ADDITION TO TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS, THERE WAS OF COURSE THE PLUNGE IN THE PRICE OF COPPER. THE US HAS RESPONDED TO THIS PROBLEM BY WORKING CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KINSHA 04345 02 OF 02 021619Z

TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL COPPER AGREEMENT IN GENEVA. THE US DECISION TO ADD 225,000 TONS OF COPPER TO ITS STRATEGIC STOCKPILE SHOULD ALSO HAVE A SALUTARY EFFECT ON COPPER PRICES. BERGSTEN THEN SAID THAT HE WAS PARTICULARLY HEARTENED BY THE FACT THAT ZAIRE, RATHER THAN FOCUSING ON THE ADVERSE EFFECT ON IT OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC EVENTS, WAS MOVING TO IMPLEMENT THE MOBUTU PLAN.

11. MOBUTU RETURNED ONCE AGAIN TO ZAIRE'S NEED FOR US PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT, BUT THIS TIME SHIFTED THE DISCUSSION TO SECURITY MATTERS. RECALLING WHAT HE CONTINUES TO VIEW AS THE INADEQUATE US RESPONSE DURING THE SHABA INVASION LAST YEAR, MOBUTU ARUGED THAT MODERATE

AFRICAN LEADERS HAD BEEN SHOCKED AND SADDENED BY THE AMBIGUOUS POSTURE OF THE US. THESE LEADERS NOW FEAR THAT THE US WILL NO LONGER PROTECT THEIR NATIONS FROM SOVIET/CUBAN ENCROACHMENT. THIS WAS NOT A PROBLEM BEFORE CARTER BECAME PRESIDENT.

12. BERGSTEN REPLIED THAT THERE HAS BEEN A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN ATTITUDES IN THE US IN RECENT YEARS OVER OUR PROPER INTERNATIONAL ROLE. THIS CHANGE MAY BE OBSERVED ABOVE ALL IN CONGRESS, WHERE IT CLEARLY PREDATES THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION. THE US REMAINS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFRICA. WE HAVE SOUGHT TO CONVEY THAT CONCERN TO MOSCOW. SOVIET/CUBAN ACTIONS IN AFRICA HAVE ADVERSELY AFFECTED OUR RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND HAVE STALLED THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S EARLY DESIRE TO MOVE TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH CUBA. WE SEEK TO PROMOTE FMS ASSISTANCE TO ZAIRE. THE US REMAINS INVOLVED AND CONCERNED; ONLY THE MANNER OF EXPRESSING THAT CONCERN HAS CHANGED.

13. BRIEFLY ILLUSTRATING THE NECESSARY LINK BETWEEN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ZAIRE'S SECURITY, MOBUTU WENT ON TO ASSERT THAT ZAIRE IS SURROUNDED BY THE "RED OF COMMUNISM." HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE OF ZAIRE A "WINDOW OF PROSPERITY" THROUGH WHICH HIS NEIGHBORS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 KINSHA 04345 02 OF 02 021619Z

COULD OBSERVE THE ADVANTAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PROSPERITY ALONG WESTERN LINES. BUT ZAIRE SUFFERS FROM AN EXTREME STRATEGIC IMBALANCE: THERE ARE 400 SOVIET TANKS IN ANGOLA AND ANOTHER 100 IN THE CONGO AGAINST ONLY 40 PRC TANKS IN ZAIRE. THERE IS A SIMILAR IMBALANCE IN AIR POWER. MOBUTU INSISTED THAT HE DOES NOT SEEK AMERICAN TROOPS, BUT ONLY THE EQUIPMENT TO GUARANTEE ZAIRE'S SECURITY.

14. BERGSTEN COMMENTED THAT HE FULLY SHARED THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW OF THE IMPORTANT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC AND SECURITY MATTERS. THE POINT OF HIS VISIT TO ZAIRE WAS TO LEARN HOW BEST THE US MIGHT HELP ZAIRE WITH THE FORMER, IN THE CONTEXT OF OVERALL US-ZAIRIAN RELATIONS.

15. MOBUTU THEN REFERRED BERGSTEN TO THE ROCKWELL REPORT ON UP-GRADING THE ZAIRIAN ARMED FORCES, WHICH HE SAID HAD APPARENTLY BEEN SET ASIDE IN WASHINGTON. AMBASSADOR CUTLER EXPLAINED THAT THE SHABA WAR HAD LED TO A REASSESSMENT OF ZAIRE'S MILITARY NEEDS, AND THAT OUR FMS PROGRAM SUPPORTED ZAIRIAN EFFORTS TO REORGANIZE AND STRENGTHEN THE ARMED FORCES THROUGH THE CONTINUED PROVISION OF BASIC TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING. DAS WALKER AND BERGSTEN BOTH MADE THE POINT THAT THE RELUCTANCE OF THE US TO BE INVOLVED MILITARILY IN ZAIRE WAS PART OF CHANGE IN US GLOBAL THINKING AND DID NOT REFLECT A WASHINGTON DECISION TO SINGLE OUT ZAIRE.

15. MOBUTU MOVED BACK TO THE SUBJECT OF ECONOMIC AID TO ZAIRE,

AND PLEDGED TO DO ALL IN HIS POWER TO ASSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE MOBUTU PLAN. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE ACCURATE CRITICISMS OF ZAIRE'S ECONOMIC PROGRAMS MADE BY HER FRIENDS HAD NOT ALWAYS BEEN ACCEPTED IN THE PAST, MOBUTU INSISTED THAT SUCH WOULD NO LONGER BE THE CASE. BUT HE STRESSED ALSO THAT ZAIRE CANNOT SUCCEED WITHOUT THE GENERAOUS ASSISTANCE OF HER FRIENDS.

16. MOBUTU THEN SAID HE WISHED TO BRING UP AN ISSUE OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF US-ZAIRIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND ARGUED THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 KINSHA 04345 02 OF 02 021619Z

US DECISION TO CUT OFF AID TO THE CAE AND UGANDA WAS A MISTAKE. HE UNDERSTOOD WHY THE US FOUND BOKASSA AND AMIN REPUGNANT, BUT THE US SHOULD DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A REGIME AND THE PEOPLE AND FIND WAYS TO CONTINUE AIDING THE LATTER. HE JOKINGLY ADDED THAT HE HOPED THAT THE US WOULD NEVER CUT OFF AID TO ZAIRE'S PEOPLE BECAUSE OF UNHAPPINESS WITH HER LEADER.

17. BERGSTEN THANKED MOBUTU FOR BRIGNING UP THE SUBJECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, WHICH WAS THE ONE ISSUE WHICH COULD IMPEDE THE US DESIRE TO AID ZAIRE. HE EXPLAINED THAT WE DO NOT SEEK TO IMPOSE ANY ARBITRARY VALUES ON ZAIRE, AND THAT WE RECOGNIZE THE CONSTRAINTS UNDER WHICH THE GOZ MUST OPERATE. BUT WE DO HOPE FOR STEADY IMPROVEMENT OF ZAIRE'S PERFORMANCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS. BERGSTEN EXPLAINED THAT CURRENT US LAW MAKES A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN AN UNATTRACTIVE REGIME AND ITS PEOPLE. THE LAW REQUIRES THE AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TO VOTE AGAINST LOANS TO COUNTRIES JUDGED TO BE GUILTY OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, EXCEPT IN THOSE CASES WHERE THE LOAN WOULD DIRECTLY BENEFIT THE PEOPLE. BERGSTNE CONCLUDED BY RE-ITERATING HIS HOPE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WOULD NOT IMPEDE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE US AND ZAIRE.

18. DEVELOPING THIS THEME, WALKER STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE FOR A REGIME OF NOT BECOMING IDENTIFIED BY CONGRESS AS A CONSISTENT VIOLATOR OF HUMAN RIGHTS. ONCE CONGRESS MAKES THAT JUDGMENT, THERE IS VERY LITTLE THE ADMINISTRATION CAN DO TO CONTINUE, MUCH LESS EXPAND, ITS AID TO THAT GOVERNMENT. MOBUTU THEN CONCLUDED THE MEETING WITH A SERIES OF JOKES AT BOKASSA'S EXPENSE WHICH NOT INCIDENTALLY PROVIDED EXAMPLES OF MOBUTU'S HAVING INTERVENED TO OBTAIN MORE HUMANE TREATMENT FOR SEVERAL OF THE EMPEROR'S INTENDED VICTIMS.

19. COMMENT: IN MARKED CONTRAST TO THE TENSION THAT HAS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 KINSHA 04345 02 OF 02 021619Z

CHARACTERIZED MOBUTU'S MOOD IN RECENT WEEKS, HE WAS RELAXED AND OFTEN SMILING THROUGHOUT THE MEETING--ONE OF THE LONGEST WITH A FOREIGN VISITOR WE CAN RECALL. THIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT SOME OF THE EXCHANGES WERE NOTABLY FRANK AND FOCUSED ON SUBJECTS OF SOME SENSITIVITY. BERGSTEN MADE VERY CLEAR THE PRIORITY WE ATTACH TO GOZ REFORMS, ESPECIALLY A NEW STABILIZATION PROGRAM, AND THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THEIR IMPLEMENTATION AND OUR ABILITY TO MAKE AVAILABLE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES. BERGSTEN ALSO MADE CLEAR THE SIMILAR RELATIONSHIP WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS, A SUBJECT WHICH WAS OBVIOUSLY ON MOBUTU'S MIND AND ON WHICH HE APPEARED SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVE. ALL TOLD, MEETING WAS EXTREMELY USEFUL AND TIMELY FROM STANDPOINT OF REASSURING MOBUTU OF OUR CONTINUED INTEREST IN ZAIRE ON THE ONE HAND, AND UNDERSCORING OUR EXPECTATION OF BETTER GOZ ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ON THE OTHER.

20. THIS MESSAGE, WITH EXCEPTION OF SUMMARY AND COMMENT, WAS CLEARED BY A/S BERGSTEN.  
CUTLER

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## Message Attributes

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**TAGS:** OVIP, EFIN, US, CG, IMF, (MOBUTU SESE SEKO), (BERGSTEN, C FRED)  
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